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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Ml \ I! t)V UTAH 
I > I . 
*i i i i i ulent, 
vs 
ANGIE BRAKE, 
Defendant/Petitioner, 
f\\ > ' N H 20020594-SC 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This k. *•«.;
 ik*.. t i r ; ^ i . . : , 4* ' r ev i s ions ^f 
Utah Code * = - .JUNJ §§ 78-2-2(3><a) and {> M* *i» i ihc t nun 01 .vp; ^w > is 
found as follows: i, )/u 11 « .v. iui in . ^ j . i H. „ i *• ^ <r- -* tided, 59 
P.3d 602. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND
 S T A N D A R D S Q F REVIEW 
1. V t 3- ** *P ts conclusion that the search of Brake's 
vehicle was justified tor reasons oi OIULCI .VIK W v,ertioidn, tins < mil • < »<i»>\ « iln 
d • ' 'iv-aN to- correctness md ;»fiords no deference to its 
conclusions. State r James, 200(1 I' I M 
C O N T R O L L I N ( ; S T A l l l T O K V PROVISIONS 
1111 in in 11 Si at es Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall'not be violated, and no 
i 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the peisons or things to 
be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Angie Brake appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming her 
conviction in Fourth District Court for attempted possession of a controlled substance, 
a class A misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Angie Brake was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on 
February 9, 2000, with possession of cocaine, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 4). 
On July 5, 2000, Brake filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds that the 
search of her vehicle constituted an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 29-40). On August 7, 2000, a 
suppression hearing was held before Judge Davis (R. 41-42). On October 10, 2000, 
Judge Lynn W. Davis denied Brake's Motion to Suppress in a signed memorandum 
decision (R. 50-64). 
On December 4, 2000, Brake entered a plea of "guilty" to attempted possession 
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, conditioned upon her right to appeal 
the denial of her motion to suppress (R. 73-74, 78). 
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On January 29, 2001, Brake was sentenced to thirty-days in the Utah County 
Jail, ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $850.00, and placed on supervised 
probation for a period of twenty-four months (R. 86-88, 104). 
Brake appealed her conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals (Case No. 
20010204-CA). The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction on May 31, 2002. State 
v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 51 P.3d 31. 
Brake petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the 
petition on October 23, 2002. State v. Brake, 59 P.3d 602. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 29, 2000, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Neil Castleberry, a sergeant 
with the Utah County Sheriffs Office, was patrolling in the area of West Geneva Road 
when he observed two vehicles—a green Nissan car and a white Chevy truck—in a small 
pullout between the road and the lake (R. 102 at 14-15). Castleberry pulled in behind the 
vehicles "to determine whether or not they needed assistance" (R. 102 at 15, 30). 
Castleberry testified that the engine to the truck was running, but that he did not know if 
the green Nissan's engine was on (R. 102 at 30). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at f2. In 
addition, nothing in the record suggests that the vehicles were either illegally parked or 
in need of assistance. 2002 UT App 190 at [^28 (Orme, j . dissenting). 
Castleberry first approached the driver's side window of the green car and spoke 
with an individual in the driver's seat after the driver had rolled the window down (R. 
102 at 15-16, 30). The individual in the driver's seat was a young female (R. 102 at 31). 
Castleberry asked the vehicle's occupants what they were doing and was informed that 
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they were sitting and talking (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry then asked the female in the 
driver's seat for identification and learned that she was fifteen years old and that she had 
not been driving the vehicle (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry was informed that the owner of 
the vehicle was sitting in the back seat (R. 102 at 16). Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at | 3 . 
Castleberry then tried to look in the vehicle but the windows were fogged (R. 102 
at 16). Although Castleberry indicated that it was "difficult" for him to see, he testified 
that he could see "two individuals in the back seat" (R. 102 at 16). 
Castleberry then went to the driver's side rear, but could not see through the 
window and so he "opened the door to be able to speak with the passenger" (R. 102 at 
16, 32). When Castleberry opened the car door, he encountered the appellant, Angie 
Brake (R. 102 at 16). Castleberry inquired of Brake as to whether she was the owner of 
the vehicle and why a fifteen-year old was sitting in the driver's seat (R. 102 at 17, 33). 
Brake informed Castleberry that she was the owner of the vehicle, that the occupants 
were from San Pete County, and that she had driven the vehicle to its present location 
and that the fifteen-year old sat in the driver's seat after their arrival (R. 102 at 17, 33). 
Castleberry asked Brake for identification (R. 102 at 33). Brake replied that her 
identification was in her purse and she pointed to the front seat and she offered to reach 
forward and retrieve it (R. 102 at 17, 34-35). Castleberry did not want Brake to retrieve 
it for officer safety reasons so he went around the rear of the vehicle and opened the front 
door on the passenger side "to retriever her purse so that [he] could hand it to her, make 
sure that there weren't any weapons" (R. 102 at 17-18, 35-36). Brake, 2002 UT App 
190 at 15. 
Once Castleberry opened the front door, he reached in and retrieved a purse (R. 
102 at 18). As he reached for the purse, he "noticed a small white bindle containing 
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white powdery substance sitting adjacent lo lln1 IHHV -HI HI*1 front seat" toward the • 
eonsole of the vehicle (T* ]. n^ -n 18 191 < ; j le berry admitted that he had to get into the 
\'».'hii:Ie to get the purse ; K. r. . 
Castleber^ - r a t i o n e d the occupants as to ownership of !he cocaine but received 
r;~ response , ;MI: H * M*<- the purse 
belonged ind wa<* informed that it helonued *o 1 »ll\ who was sitting in me white if uck 
a. . ,i.w; u • ' r ^ r r 1 * walked o* *M ;o 
ib^ tn s ^k 'R HO m 4^ K Castlebem lesiii t he approaUKi iui. tin i w ^ a ^ . c ^ 
. w . „ , , - - " >ii^aVt\ -R. iU2a t44 j . £ r a / x , 
U T A p p i % a l f » 
When ir.
 c o -. . . -H;^  the Hop?- a^d asked die occupant if 
she was " I . i lk" (R. 102 at -+ - He then had u l k c \n i-^ u . u .^ij u..i.fc~ ;._•. ml lln: 
cocaine in,luiii(i«i"(i m i i i CnsiIcherrv also field tested the bindle and it 
tested postively for cocaine (R. 102 at 14, 42, J *} 
L : . - • l < 4 . s n i' I * n i k e' s purse somewhere in the front area of the 
vehicle iR 102 at 38). 
Castlcbcrrv snbse<|uently interviewed Brake, without administering the Miranda 
warnings, in order to In HI v)ui u- • • • ,i^ ^ ^ J . I I L K;^ -j^ c-* >*- »»• 
ii ? :*-d Ca^Ie^c*^ IKQ1 CK'* did not know who owned the cocaine (k ;w2 at :u 
Castlebeiry que^uoiivu i>3iu^ .,.:.4;.i " ' ' ^asromu 
to happen, he h%ld h«->!" that because she owned the \ehicle. she was the u-bpoiisink /;<f 
and would be an^iv\: . ;\.\s-esh!- lair* • ownership of it 
(R. 1 , n ''t ?0-"> i * C^ t l ebeny testified that Brake then admitted to ownership o: ^ 
cocamuiK. . *•- - , r -i' ; : * iaimed ownership of some 
D 
drug paraphernalia that was found in the back window of the vehicle (R. 102 at 21). 
Brake later informed Castleberry that the cocaine belonged to the driver of the white 
truck, Juan Carlos Juarez and that everyone in both vehicles had used from that same 
container (R. 102 at 25, 28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Brake asserts that Sergeant Castleberry's opening of the front passenger door to her 
vehicle constituted a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution that was not minimal nor was it justified either by probable cause or as a 
search for weapons. Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court overturn the legal conclusion 
of the Court of Appeals that the warrantless search was justified on grounds of "officer 
safety"; and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions 
that her plea is to Ibe withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE 
SEARCH OF BRAKE'S VEHICLE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER TIDE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Brake appealed from a conviction of attempted possession of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor. Prior to the entry of her conditional plea, Brake filed a 
motion to suppress in the trial court alleging that the search of her vehicle constituted an 
illegal search and seizure requiring suppression of all evidence discovered as a result of 
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the search The Hal court denies iln niuiio.. *,^~^ ., <^^ * 
Brake '••. *^ ehiile-lhe »pcnin|.', :'** '~^nt passenger d<ior ;uid the subsequent entn into the 
vehicle to retrieve a purse—was jush u^i ior i easua. 
nneals affirmed tb»* ^ onvienon on pounds . t officer safet\ huikt, 
:002T;l App IW at ^24-27. .uu t, *.,.„. ;..,,... c-- . 1 *'»"? ! 
'
4
 • \c a^se^s jhat the Court of Appeals' decision is erroneou> iiu> 
*« »onihct witn pnoi uccisit m ;.oii. ,..,. ~ * *^s* thai 'iiii 
•** ** ;M:J **onclusio" .*t ihe Court of Appeals thai the warrantless st.» K 
wasjusiiiied on grounds of "officer saieh ' .iiul Ihal lln inlln I ' remanded to the 
' ' • * v^uurt w ith instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn,, the e\ lunice 
suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
rh< p-es^^i 'v* mi.> under Fourth Amendment case law "relating to reasonable 
searches and >e*, «,^, ,, mat searu- fed without a w^^ant supported 
~ —ebable cause/ V-v . rames, 2000 IJT 80 at V> I M ^ J I> A.woi i . .:. tl 
lias a lesser expectau !KM ,ii'*,,fi " w .ines not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in a vehicle Su.tL < ^  u„ . . 
* lessor — re-*1'*' .-<n of prnacv that has 
refilled *• u ^automobile exception io me wairani run ML, , .... ^ 
. "PiinK- !««', ** -asonable suspicion of criminal 
activity for the purposes o\ conducting a smuku ai.^.i • 1M hnnv\ 
I'OOO I 11 Mil .il "I III I lii" detention %v*v* h^ "temporan and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose K>\ U.^ .,u,p 
I nUlihnii "i mini? to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the 
intrusion, officers may order the occupants til a vehicle lo h\n •, lln; •vhi. le during the 
/ 
course of the investigation." James, 2000 UT 80 at [^10. However, "if no arrest is made, 
an officer may make a warrantless search of the automobile only if there is probable cause 
for the search" or "if the officer has a reasonable and 'articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is potentially dangerous5" and "'may gain immediate control of weapons.'" 
Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137 (citing United States v. Ross, 434 U.S. 798, 825, 102 
S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) and quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1049,1052-55 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 3482-83 n.16, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). 
Moreover, the opening of a vehicle to search for physical evidence door constitutes a 
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. James, 2000 UT 80 at f 13; Schlosser, 11A P.2d 
at 1135-36. See also, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67, 
89L.Ed.2d81(1986). 
In reaching its decision to affirm the conviction on grounds that a proper search 
and seizure was performed, the Court of Appeals first concluded that a governmental 
interest exists in removing unlicensed drivers from the road and that Castleberry "having 
discovered an underage and unlicensed individual at the wheel of a running vehicle" was 
justified in requesting identification from Brake who owned the vehicle. Brake, 2002 UT 
App 190 at ^[23. However, the Court of Appeals' decision erroneously ascertained that 
the vehicle was running. This indication is clearly erroneous and not supported by 
Castleberry's testimony. Castleberry testified that the engine to the truck was running, but 
that he did not know if the green Nissan's engine was on (R. 102 at 30). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the search of Brake's vehicle was justified 
under an officer safety exception and also because the intrusion was deemed to be 
minimal. The Court of Appeals cited the following facts to support its conclusion: Both 
vehicles were running in a desolate and frequent crime area. An under-aged driver was 
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sitting in the driver's seat of the green Ni^an -• r ^ . *t m <K,: two 
.  Inc. k , 1 l.i1 windows \UTC focued and c \astleberry was <inahle '•> identity the 
passengers in the rear seat of the .\iss«. .:,. ; „. -. - *" •* 
I .,, ; t i r } H T n \. • ». 1. 1 i«. •% 2^»n 1 rr Ann h*o n « 
As established atH*\L. Uiw i ^.i...^ ;
 4ippL\i '• - *ne ^as 
1 iiiiiiiiii11 if , learlv erroneous and not supported h\ Castleberry's tcstimom In addr n 
tin: majority opinion, omits several imp .. t: < H e , althoi . 
•
 T
 "" - *ivc individi lals present in it«em*- vehicles, Castleberry did not call n>\ t\n k-
up untn uiici ihc search of the - ' * * i1, . >ncerned for his 
,, • * \ 013! (! h'" ^ i- a i Ied for back-up and would have taken other preL auii onQ™ 
•* » .-•• t . ,w^ ^ ' Hi1 ill' "i ' i i 1 ' hi1 >'i s u y f t c i s thai d i e v e b i ' !es ucr . 1 e i t h e r 
p ' t r k ^ d i» ?T) run*d o f a s s i s t a n c e . Brake, 2 0 0 2 U T A p p l'-M) a t *j28 ( U r m c . , 
•' 1. . . . • \ i1 sp iess lv Ics l i i i ed thnl In1 e l ec t ed to o p e n t h e v e h i c l e ' s 
jLiUiii d u o r an«* - e\ r the n u r s e so that h e c o u l d " m a k e - a r t IK? m c i c v ^ . d ; ; a ;u 
weapons" * *• • *1-' - - * ^ 
n^ reaching its conclusion thai I?K U'UUMOII ud> IMIUUHUI -^d m~ ;..*. 
U ^ L I K ^ i ! ' ! " ' v ' v'!^ t f vnneik rHied 011 \Vvr }'>n » 
Class 475 I LS 106. lo<* SAY voU ( Ivho) m * ,u.o. d^ .nii^c. 
!N number from (h* vehicle, alter the defendants had 
\olunianl\ exited the vehicle, />'/u/vt.J^< . * * s 
- •
 r r u ;n., , ^^;?nCjno (est between 'he "beo\ernmentai interest a 
;;way safet) sei\cu m whuujuj^ «... '-- : ' -v. " 
*"ind of obtaining the VIN was justified ( ' ^ 1 ^ t x h"-
S. C t aty&8. 
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The basis for which the U.S. Supreme Court found that the police officers were 
justified in opening the door of the car and moving the papers in order to retrieve the VTN 
of the vehicle, was because "the VIN plays an important part in the pervasive regulation 
by the government of the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such regulation 
will on occasion require the State to determine the VIN of his or her vehicle, and the 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished. This is 
especially true in the case of a driver who has committed a traffic violation." 106 S.Ct. at 
965. 
Furthermore the Court concluded, "it is unreasonable to have an expectation of 
privacy in an object required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from 
the exterior of the automobile. The VINfs mandated visibility makes it more similar to the 
exterior of the car than to the trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of course, 
is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a "search.'1" Id. at 
966. The Supreme Court also stated that even though the interior of an vehicle is not 
subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist within one's home, a car's interior as 
a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable 
intrusions by the police. Id. 
The facts in Class are very distinguishable from those of the present case. In the 
present case, the officer was not searching for a VIN of the automobile and had not pulled 
the automobile over for any violations of the law. The vehicle was parked legally and the 
officer had no reason to retrieve the VIN of the vehicle. 
By basing their majority opinion on the outcome of Class, the Court of Appeals 
ignores both the distinguishing facts of this case and prior Utah case law concerning the 
10 
search of the interior of a vehicle for weapons in the course of an investigatory stop. 
Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at ffi[28-31 (Orme, j . dissenting). 
For example prior Utah cases establish that an officer may only conduct a weapons 
search if he "reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may obtain immediate control 
of weapons." State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992). For such a search 
to be justified, however, "a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances [must 
believe] that his safety... was in danger." State v. Roybal, 116 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986). 
Brake maintains that Castleberry's warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment was not a minimal intrusion and that it was not supported by "reasonable 
and articulable suspicion" that Brake or the other occupants of the vehicle were dangerous 
or that there were weapons present. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38 
(Utah 1989). "An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief 
that the suspect is dangerous and 'may gain immediate control of weapons.'" Schlosser, 
11A P.2d at 1137 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 3481). However, "'due 
weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the 
facts in light of his experience.'" Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1137 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals main opinion completely ignores this Court's 
prior decision in State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996). In Chapman, this Court 
held that "a weapons search was not warranted, even though the suspect was a gang 
member who had reputedly carried a weapon in the past, where 'nothing about the nature 
of the underlying offense being investigated'—i.e., parking on school property after hours-
-'prompted a concern for safety... [and] [n]othing defendant, did, by way of conduct, 
11 
attitude, or gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon in the vehicle.'" Brake, 2002 UT 
App 190 at Tf30 (Orme, J. dissenting) (quoting Chapman, 921 P.2d at 454). 
In Chapman, the officer, upon discovering the illegally parked vehicle, pulled 
behind the vehicle and turned his warning lights on the defendant's vehicle. Chapman, 
921 P.2d at 448. The officer did not see any weapons, he only had knowledge that the 
defendant had the reputation of carrying a weapon and that he was a known gang 
member. Nothing about being illegally parked in a school parking lot, by its very nature, 
suggested the presence of weapons and therefore this Court concluded that the officer was 
not justified in searching for weapons to ensure his own safety. 
In this case, similarly, Brake asserts that the officer was not justified in making any 
search for weapons for his safety, because "nothing about a motorist possibly needing 
assistance, or even underage driving, by its very nature suggests the presence of 
weapons." Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at |31 (Orme, J. dissenting). Castleberry, the 
officer, testified that he originally stopped and approached Brake's vehicle to determine 
whether or not they needed assistance (R. 102 at 15, 30). Upon approaching the parked 
vehicle, Castleberry found that an underage driver was sitting in the driver's seat of the 
vehicle (R. 102 at 16, 31). Accordingly, Brake asserts that the officer was not justified to 
search even part of the interior of the vehicle for weapons while conducting his 
investigation of underage driving and that all evidence found as a result of the search 
should have been suppressed. Id. The officer did not see any weapons, did not observe in 
furtive movements or other conduct consistent with the presence of a weapon, and the 
officer had no reason to believe that weapons were present. Id. 
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Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court overturn the legal conclusion of the Court 
of Appeals that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment on 
grounds that it was a minimal intrusion supported by reasons of "officer safety". 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Brake asks that this Court reverse the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with 
instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter 
dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17TH day of March, 2003. 
Margaret P Lindsay 
Counsel for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 17th day of 
March, 2003. 
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ADDENDA 
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STATE v. 
Cite as 51 P.3d 31 
ft is adequate because the trial court was 
sufficiently familiar with the case to make 
+jje determination without a precise affidavit. 
Each requirement is discussed in order be-
low. 
[12] 1119 First, while Sieg omitted the 
legal basis for seeking attorney fees from his 
affidavit, this does not warrant reversal by 
itself because the parties and the judge knew 
the legal basis for seeking attorney fees. In 
Ball v. NACM Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 
97, 988 P.2d 942, the supreme court held that 
because both the court and counsel were 
aware of the legal basis for seeking attorney 
fees, there was no prejudice from a failure to 
state a legal basis in the affidavit. See id. at 
H21. In this case, the trial court and counsel 
knew that the Agreement provided the legal 
basis for attorney fees. Therefore, Sieg's 
omission does not warrant reversal. 
; 1120 Second, the affidavit states the num-
ber of hours the attorney spent in prosecut-
ing the matter. Sieg details the number of 
hours his attorney and an associate worked 
on the case as well as the rate at which each 
billed. Therefore, Sieg's counsel complied 
with the second requirement of rule 4-505(1). 
[13] 1121 Finally, Premier argues that 
Sieg failed to explain the nature of the ser-
vices his attorney rendered. Under Utah 
law, the party claiming attorney fees is re-
quired to provide the trial court with suffi-
cient evidence to allow a determination of 
reasonableness. See Cabrera u Cottrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). Although the 
evidence Sieg produced at trial is not ideal, it 
is sufficient because the parties and the trial 
court knew that the dispositive issue in this 
case was whether there was adequate consid-
eration to support a sale or exchange. The 
record shows that the trial court was very 
familiar with this issue and the quality of the 
work Sieg's counsel provided. Therefore, 
under the facts of this case and the discretion 
accorded to the trial court, the evidence pre-
sented was sufficient to affirm the award of 
attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
If 22 In sum, the transfer of the Property 
from Sieg to MJTM was not supported by 
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consideration so as to constitute a sale or 
exchange. Because no sale or exchange oc-
curred, Sieg owes no commission under the 
Agreement. Since Sieg has prevailed below 
and on appeal, he was correctly awarded 
attorney fees and is entitled to fees incurred 
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 
court's decision on both issues and remand to 
the trial court to determine the amount of 
reasonable attorney fees Sieg is entitled to as 
a result of this appeal. 
II23 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM 
A. THORNE JR., Judge. 
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STATE of Utah, Appellee, 
v. 
Angie BRAKE, Appellant. 
No. 20010204-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 31, 2002. 
After denial of her motion to suppress 
evidence of cocaine found in vehicle, defen-
dant pled guilty in the Fourth District Court, 
Provo Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., to 
attempted possession of a controlled sub-
stance. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Thorne, J., held that: (1) police offi-
cer's request for defendant's driver's license 
was justified and reasonable; (2) officer's con-
cern for safety justified officer's warrantless 
entry into vehicle to retrieve purse; and (3) 
officer's retrieval of purse from vehicle, to 
extent action constituted a search, was mini-
mally intrusive in furtherance of legitimate 
public safety concerns. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed an opinion. 
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1. Criminal Law <3=>1139,1158(4) 
In reviewing a motion to suppress, a 
trial court's factual findings are reviev/ed 
deferentially under the clearly erroneous 
standard, and its conclusions of law are re-
viewed for correctness with some discretion 
given to the application of the legal standards 
to the underlying factual findings. 
2. Arrest <s=>63.5(9) 
Police officer's request for driver's li-
cense of vehicle owner who was sitting in 
back seat of the running vehicle parked on 
side of road was justified and reasonable, 
where officer had originally asked girl m 
driver's seat for a valid driver's license, put 
girl informed officer she was too young to 
have a driver's license and that the vehicle 
owner was sYrtnng in tiie "back seat. 13 .S.C-k-
ConstAmend. 4; U.CA.1953, 41-6-165, 41-8-
1(1). 
3. Searches and Seizures <3=>65 
Police officer's warrantless entry into ve-
hicle to retrieve occupant's purse from frtfnt 
passenger seat, upon being told by occupant, 
who was in back seat, that her identification 
was in purse, was justified in light of officer's 
concerns for his safety, and thus constitution-
ally permissible; officer was unable to gee 
into backseat due to the darkness and fogged 
windows, there were a total of five individu-
als in two vehicles that appeared to be run-
ning, officer was in a desolate and high crifne 
area, and purse was located in dark area out 
of his control. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures <£=>65 
To the extent that police officer's action 
constituted a search, officer's warrantless en-
try into vehicle to retrieve occupant's putse 
from front passenger seat, upon being told 
by occupant, who was in back seat, that her 
identification was in purse, was focused and 
minimally intrusive in furthering legitimate 
public safety concern, and thus constitution-
ally permissible, where officer did not root 
through the interior of the vehicle, did pot 
reach into any compartments, and did pot 
open any containers. U.S.CA Copst. 
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THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge. 
111 Appellant Angie Brake (Brake) appeals 
from a conviction for Attempted Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a class A misde-
meanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.1999). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
112 On January 29, 2000, at approximately 
11:45 p.m., Utah County Deputy Sheriff Neil 
Castleberry (Castleberry) observed two ve-
hicles stopped in a small pullout on the side 
of the road west of the Geneva Steel plant. 
Castleberry pulled up behind the vehicles to 
inquire whether the occupants of either ve-
hicle needed assistance. Because he was 
merely mquiring whether anyone needed as-
sistance, Castleberry did not have his emer-
gency lights on when he approached the ve-
hicles. Castleberry, however, was aware 
that the vehicles were stopped in an ..area 
"known for frequent criminal activity." 
113 Upon exiting his vehicle, Castleberry 
approached one of the two vehicles, a green 
Nissan, which he beheved had the engine 
running. Castleberry observed a young 
woman in the driver's seat. He asked the 
^WSSSOSt <&> ^ <&. <&£>TOi ^ k ^ 'TON&STO, ^ ^ & <&&. 
did, and then he asked for her driver license. 
The woman told Castleberry that she was 
fifteen years-old and that she did not have a 
driver license. The woman also told Castle-
berry that she had not been driving the 
vehicle. Castleberry then inquired about the 
vehicle's owner, and the woman told him that 
the vehicle's owner was sitting in the back-
seat. 
114 Because the vehicle's windows were 
fogged, Castleberry was unable to see clearly 
into the backseat. He was able, however, to 
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see that two persons, a male and a female, claimed ownership because 
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were sitting in the backseat. Because his 
vision was obscured, Castleberry opened the 
backseat door to speak to the two persons. 
Brake, who was sitting in the backseat, iden-
tified herself as both the vehicle's owner and 
the driver. Brake told Castleberry that she 
and the others, including the individuals in 
the other vehicle, were from Sanpete County. 
She also told Castleberry that she had 
changed seats with the fifteen-year-old when 
they arrived at their current location. 
115 Castleberry asked Brake for her identi-
fication. Brake told Castleberry that her 
identification was in her purse and pointed to 
the front passenger seat, where no one was 
sitting. Because the purse was located "in a 
dark area over which he h[ad] no control[J"* 
Castleberry decided, for safety reasons, to 
retrieve the purse himself. Castleberry 
walked around to the passenger side of the 
front seat and opened the vehicle door to 
retrieve the purse. As Castleberry reached 
inside the vehicle to remove the purse, he 
saw, in plain view, a white bindle next to the 
purse near the vehicle's console. 
116 Castleberry picked up the purse and 
asked for its owner. Someone sitting in the 
Nissan told Castleberry that the purse be-
longed to "Lilly," and that she was sitting in 
the other vehicle. Castleberry took the purse 
and the bindle over to the other vehicle. He 
opened the vehicle's door and asked for Lilly. 
Castleberry also asked the persons sitting in 
the vehicle if the purse belonged to Lilly. 
One of the two persons identified herself as 
Lilly and told Castleberry that she owned 
the purse. Lilly, however, denied owning the 
bindle. Castleberry had Lilly exit the vehi-
cle and continued to question her at his 
patrol car. He also tested the white pow-
dery substance contained in the bindle, which 
tested positive for cocaine. 
1f 7 Castleberry proceeded back to the Nis-
san and asked the three individuals who 
owned the cocaine. Castleberry received no 
response from them. Unable to determine 
who owned the cocaine, Castleberry told 
Brake that she would be arrested if no one 
1« This quote comes from the trial court's Ruling 
on Motion to Suppress, II10 
she owned the 
vehicle. Brake then admitted that the co-
caine belonged to her and that she and the 
others had used the cocaine throughout the 
evening. Castleberry arrested Brake and 
called for backup. A subsequent search of 
the Nissan uncovered drug paraphernalia. 
118 Brake was bound over on charges of 
possessing a controlled substance and unlaw-
ful possession of drug paraphernalia. Brake 
subsequently filed a motion to suppress both 
the cocaine and her mmminating state-
ments.2 The trial court denied Brake's Mo-
tion as it pertained to the admissibility of the 
cocaine and granted her Motion pertaining to 
her mcriminating statements. 
U 9 In denying that portion of Brake's Mo-
tion to Suppress, the trial court concluded 
that opening the vehicle's front passenger 
door to retrieve the purse was justifiable 
under the officer safety exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
The trial court relied upon the following facts 
in reaching its decision: 
1. [Castleberry] was alone on patrol and 
had not yet called for backup. 
2. It was late at night; it was dark and 
none of the occupants lived in Utah 
County. 
3. The road is located in a remote area of 
Utah County and . . . Castleberry de-
scribed it as a "deserted road." 
4. There were two vehicles at the site 
with occupants in each (three occu-
pants in the subject vehicle and two 
occupants in the pickup truck which 
was parked contiguous). 
5. This was an area of frequent criminal 
activity. 
6. [Castleberry's] vision was severely re-
stricted because of the darkness and 
the fact that all of the windows were 
fogged up. 
7. The other vehicle was rurming and . . . 
Castleberry testified he believed that 
the subject vehicle had the engine on 
with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl 
behind the wheel and two other pas-
sengers in the back seat. 
I. Castleberry had questioned Brake before ad-
ministering her Miranda warning 
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K 10 As a result of the trial court's deer 
sion, Brake pleaded guilty to attempted pos^ 
session of a controlled substance. She condr 
tioned her plea on the right to appeal th£ 
trial court's partial denial of her Motion W 
Suppress. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDAED OF REVIEW 
[1] Ull Brake argues the trial court 
erred by denying that portion of her Motiotf 
to Suppress alleging that by opening th# 
passenger door to obtain the purse, Castle' 
berry's actions constituted an impermissible 
warrantless search. In reviewing £ motion 
to suppress, "[a] trial court's factual finding^ 
are reviewed deferentially under the clearly 
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness with some 
standards to the underlying factual findings/ 
State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, 116, 18 P.3d 
1116. 
ANALYSIS 
[2-4] II12 Brake argues that Castleberry 
conducted an impermissible warranties^ 
search when he opened the Nissan's front 
passenger door to retrieve the purse, and 
therefore, violated her Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. To support her argument, Brake re-
lies upon State v, Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 
(Utah 1989). 
1f 13 In Schlosser, a Utah Highway Patrol 
trooper stopped a vehicle for a traffic viola-
tion. See id at 1133. As the vehicle pulled 
to the side of the road, the trooper observed 
the defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, 
the left and to the right, and turning back to 
look at the [trooper]." Id. The movement 
drew the trooper's attention. 
1114 After the vehicle stopped, the driver 
exited the vehicle, approached the trooper, 
and presented the trooper his license and 
registration. See id. at 1133-34. All the 
while, the trooper noticed that the defendant 
"continued to move about the cab of the 
truck." Id. at 1134. As a result of the 
3. The defendant also moved to suppress drug 
paraphernalia and two firearms, which the 
defendant's behavior, the trooper concluded 
that the defendant "was trying to hide some-
thing." Id. The trooper approached the pas-
senger side of the vehicle, tapped on the 
window, and opened the door. See id. The 
trooper "scanned the interior of the truck for 
contraband and saw a bag of marijuana in 
the passenger door pocket." Id The trooper 
also "smelled marijuana smoke." Id The 
trooper arrested both the defendant and the 
driver. 
1115 The defendant moved to suppress the 
marijuana.3 The trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion and suppressed "all the evi-
dence seized." Id The trial court concluded 
that the trooper "acted on 'a mere suspicion 
that the defendant . . . was engaged in crimi-
nal activity,' and had no legal basis for the 
search and seizure." Id (citation omitted). 
The State appealed. 
1116 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's ruling. See id. at 1139. The 
court concluded that the trooper's opening 
the vehicle door was a "search." Id at 1135. 
The court also concluded that the search was 
unlawful. See id at 1135-36. The court 
reasoned that 
[the trooper's] testimony established that 
his opening the car door exceeded the 
legitimate objectives of a traffic stop. The 
[trooper's] "clear initial objective" in open-
ing the car door was to see whether [the 
defendant] was "hiding something." How-
ever, without probable cause to justify it, 
that act clearly exceeded the lawful scope 
of a legitimate government interest. 
Id. 
1117 Finally, the court explained that the 
for his actions; he sought only to investigate 
the possibility that defendants were engaged 
in illegal activity." Id at 1137. Because of 
the safety concerns in the present case, we 
conclude that Schlosser is inapplicable to the 
present matter. 
1118 The facts and the reasoning set forth 
in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,106 S.Ct. 
960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), are applicable to 
the present matter. In Class, the United 
trooper discovered while searching the vehicle 
See id 
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States Supreme Court held that a minimally 
intrusive warrantless search was justified in 
light of the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches when bal-
anced against concerns for police officer safe-
ty. See id. at 117-18, 106 S.Ct. at 967-68. 
1119 In Class, police officers stopped the 
defendant for two traffic violations. See tc£ 
at 107-08, 106 S.Ct. at 962. Upon stopping 
his vehicle, the defendant exited and ap-
proached one of the two officers conducting 
the stop. See id. at 108, 106 S.Ct. at 963. 
While one of the officers spoke with the 
defendant, the other officer proceeded to the 
defendant's vehicle and opened the door in 
an effort to locate the VIN number. See id. 
The officer was unable to locate the VIN 
number on the doorjamb, and, subsequently, 
he reached into the vehicle's interior to re-
move some papers that obscured the area of 
the dashboard where the VIN number was 
also located. See id* Upon doing so, th^ 
officer saw a gun protruding from under* 
neath the driver's seat. See id. The officers 
arrested the defendant. See id. 
120 The defendant filed a motion to sup-
press the gun, which the trial court denied, 
See id. Ultimately, the New York Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding 
that the officer's intrusion into the vehicle 
was a search that was not justified because 
the facts of the case " 'reveal no reason for 
the officer to suspect other criminal activity 
[besides the traffic infractions] or to protect 
his own safety.' " Id. at 109, 106 S.Ct. at 963 
(quoting State v. Class, 63 N.Y2d 491, 483 
N.Y.S.2d 181, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (1984)), 
1121 The United States Supreme Court 
reversed. The Court determined that "the 
governmental interest in highway safety 
served by obtaining the VIN is of the first 
order, and the particular method of obtaining 
the VIN here was justified by a concern for 
the officers' safety." Id at 118, 106 S.Ct. at 
968. The Court reasoned that "[t]he search 
was focused in its objective and no more 
intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objec-
tive." Id 
H 22 As a result, the Court held that 
4. Utah Code Ann § 41-6-165 (1998), states "It 
is unlawful for the owner of any vehicle 
knowingly to permit the operation of such vehi-
this search was sufficiently unintrusive to 
be constitutionally permissible in light of 
the lack of reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in the VIN and the fact that the officers 
observed respondent commit two traffic 
violations. Any other conclusion would ex-
pose police officers to potentially grave 
risks without significantly reducing the in-
trusiveness of the ultimate conduct—view-
ing the VIN—which, as we have said, the 
officers were entitled to do as part of an 
undoubtedly justified traffic stop. 
Id. at 119,106 S.Ct. at 968. 
U23 The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that a governmental interest exists in "re-
moving unlicensed drivers from the road for 
public safety reasons." State v. Harmon, 
910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (addressing 
the public safety concerns of individuals driv-
ing with a suspended license). Moreover, 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-8-1(1) (1998) prohibits 
a person under sixteen years old from oper-
ating a motor vehicle. And, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-165 (1998) makes it a crime for a 
vehicle's owner to allow an'underage and 
unlicensed person to operate that vehicle.4 
Having discovered an underage and unli-
censed individual at the wheel of a running 
vehicle, we conclude that it was both justifi-
able and reasonable for Castleberry to re-
quest from Brake, the vehicle's owner, her 
driver license "in light of the governmental 
interest in removing unlicensed drivers from 
the road for public safety reasons." Har-
mon, 910 P.2d at 1203. 
1f24 Our conclusion that Castleberry was 
both justified and reasonable in his request 
to Brake, also leads this court to conclude 
that the United States Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Class, concerning police officer 
safety, is applicable in this matter. Specifi-
cally, in the situation facing Castleberry, he 
was justified in his decision to retrieve the 
purse. 
U 25 Castleberry approached two vehicles, 
both of which he believed to be running, in a 
desolate and frequent crime area. After he 
had encountered the Nissan's occupants, 
cle upon a highway in any manner contrary to 
law." Id 
36 Utah 51 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
Castleberry discovered that (1) the individual 
in the Nissan's driver's seat was fifteen 
years-old and did not possess a driver li-
cense; (2) due to the darkness and fogged up 
windows, he was unable to see clearly into 
the Nissan's backseat to identify the passen-
gers sitting in the backseat; (3) the individu-
als in both vehicles totaled five; and (4) the 
purse was located ui a dark area out of his 
control. 
1126 When Castleberry set out to retrieve 
the purse, "[t]he search was focused in its 
objective and no more intrusive than neces-
sary to fulfill that objective." Class, 475 U.S. 
at 118,106 S.Ct. at 968. As in Class, Castle-
berry did not "root about the interior of 
[Brake's vehicle]." Id. Further, "[Castleber-
ry] did not reach into any compartments or 
open any containers." Id. Ultimately, Cast-
leberry's "safety [and a legitimate public 
safety concern] w[ere] served by the [mini-
mal] governmental intrusion." Id. at 117, 
106 S.Ct. at 968. The trial court's decision to 
deny Brake's Motion to Suppress, as it re-
lates to Castleberry's retrieval of the purse, 
is therefore affirmed.5 
1127 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Judge. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting). 
1128 Two facts, omitted from the main 
opinion, bear mention. First, the officer os-
tensibly set about to see if the occupants of 
the lawfully parked vehicles needed assis-
tance even though nothing in the record sug-
gests a trunk or hood was open, jacks and a 
spare tire were positioned by either vehicle, 
5. Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, Castleber-
ry neither requested nor conducted a weapons 
search of either the vehicle or llie purse Castle-
berry merely retrieved the purse from a dark 
area within the vehicle that was outside of his 
immediate control and sought to convey the 
purse to its owner Castleberry did not search 
the purse, and therefore, as we stated above, to 
the extent that Castleberry's action constituted a 
search it was focused m its objective and no 
more intrusive than necessary See New York v 
Class, 475 U S at 118, 106 S Ct at 968 Ulti-
mately, Castleberry's action helped to ensure not 
only his safety, but also the safety of those in the 
vehicle 
1. As pomted out m footnote 5 of the mam opin-
ion, the officer's purpose—to "make sure that 
or emergency flashers were activated. Sec-
ond, the officer expressly testified that he 
elected to open the one vehicle's front door 
and retrieve the purse so that he could 
"make sure that there weren't any weap-
ons." x 
If 29 Utah law concerning the search of the 
interior of a vehicle for weapons, in the 
course of an investigatory stop, is clear. As 
explained in a series of cases, none of which 
are cited in the main opinion, an officer may 
conduct a weapons search only if he "reason-
ably believes a suspect is dangerous and may 
obtain immediate control of weapons." State 
v Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah CtApp. 
1992). This regimen also applies to traffic 
stops, even though they are regarded as 
potentially dangerous. See id. at 869. Such 
a search is justified only if " 'a reasonably 
prudent [person] in the circumstances would 
be warranted in the belief that his safety 
was in danger.' " State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 
291, 293 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). And such a belief can 
originate in the officer's contemporaneous 
observations—either of a weapon or of some 
furtive movements consistent with retrieval 
of a weapon—or in the inherent nature of the 
underlying offense. See State v. Chapman, 
921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996). 
1130 Thus, in Bradford, a weapons search 
was permitted not because of a generalized 
safety concern or because the intrusion was 
deemed slight, but because the officer no-
ticed the driver pull a black bag toward the 
front of the car from an area where the 
there weren't any weapons"—was not disclosed 
to the occupants of the vehicle Contrary to the 
claim in that footnote, however, the officer can-
didly admitted this was his purpose in entering 
the vehicle and retrieving the purse himself—this 
is not something I have created from whole 
cloth The officer satisfied himself that there 
were no weapons m the area where he located 
the purse It is true he did not search the purse, 
but at that pomt m time he had seen the bindle 
and the focus of the encounter had therefore 
dramatically changed Moreover, the record 
does not disclose trie size, shape, or weight of the 
purse It is entirely possible the officer did not 
search the purse only because its size, shape, and 
weight were inconsistent with the possibility it 
contained a firearm 
STATE v, 
Cite as 51 P.3d 37 
officer earlier observed a rifle. See 839 P.2d 
at 871. And in State v. Strickhng, 844 P.2d 
979 (Utah CtApp.1992), a weapons search 
was upheld where a vehicle's occupants were 
suspected of involvement in a burglary. See 
id. at 984 (noting " 'ft]t is reasonable for an 
officer to believe that a burglar may be 
armed with weapons' ") (quoting State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)). Con-
versely, in reversing this court in Chapman, 
the Utah Supreme Court held a weapons 
search was not warranted, even though the 
suspect was a gang member who had reput-
edly carried a weapon in the past, where 
" *[n]othing about the nature of the underly-
ing offense being investigated' "—i.e., park-
ing on school property after hours— 
" 'prompted a concern for safety . . . 
[and][n]othing defendant did, by way of con-
duct, attitude, or gesture, suggested the 
presence of a weapon in the vehicle.' " State 
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 
(Utah CtApp.1992) (Orme, J., dissenting)). 
1131 Applying the correct legal doctrine to 
this case, rather than the jurisprudence 
which has developed concerning law enforce1 
ment's entitlement to ascertain a vehicle 
identification number, leads to the opposite 
result from that reached by the majority. 
The officer did not see any weapons, nor 
does the record suggest he observed any 
furtive movements or other conduct consis-
tent with the retrieval or presence of a weap-
on. And nothing about a motorist possibly 
needing assistance, or even underage driving, 
by its very nature suggests the presence of 
weapons. It follows that the officer was not 
entitled to search even part of the interior of 
the vehicle for weapons while conducting his 
investigation of possible underage driving, 
and that all evidence found as a result of that 
search should have been suppressed. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Michael BUNTING, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 20010016-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 6, 2002. 
Defendant pled guilty in the Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake Department, Timothy 
R. Hanson, J., to child abuse homicide. De-
fendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bill-
ings, Associate P.J., held that: (1) misrepre-
sentations by detectives during interview 
with defendant were not sufficient to over-
come defendant's will; (2) statements by de-
tective during interview with defendant did 
not constitute threats or suggestions of le-
niency which had overcome defendant's free 
to have induced defendant into making in-
criminating statements; (3) detectives, in con-
ducting interview with defendant, did not 
employ "false friend technique" to induce 
defendant to make incriminating statements; 
and (4) tactics by detectives during interview 
with defendant did not exploit any known 
mental or psychological condition of defen-
dant to induce incriminating statements. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=1158(4) 
In reviewing the denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress, an appellate court recites 
the facts in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings. 
2. Criminal Law <s=*1134(3) 
The ultimate determination of voluntari-
ness of incriminating statements is a legal 
question that an appellate court reviews for 
correctness. U.S.CA. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1158(1) 
An appellate court sets aside a trial 
court's factual findings only if they are clear-
ly erroneous. 
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Defendant, Angie M. Brake, filed her Motion to Suppress on July 5, 2000. A 
suppression hearing was conducted on August 7, 2000. Defendant was present and was 
represented by Mr. Paul Dewitt, Esq. Mr. David Clark, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 
represented the State of Utah. 
The matter was taken under advisement and the State of Utah was given time to file a 
memorandum. The State filed its Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on August 15, 2000. 
The Court, having considered the testimony at the hearing, arguments of counsel, and 
legal memoranda, now finds and rules as follows: 
1. On January 29, 2000, Deputy Castlebeny of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was 
on patrol alone in an isolated area of Utah County on a road which goes along Utah Lake by the 
Lindon Boat Harbor and which is directly west of the Geneva Steel Plant. 
2. Officer Castlebeny testified that this is an area that "has been known to frequent 
criminal activity." Transcript at page 33. 
3. It was a dark, cold winter night at approximately 11:45 p.m. when Officer 
Castlebeny spotted two vehicles off the road. Officer Castlebeny stopped to investigate and "to 
determine whether or not they needed assistance. . ." Transcript at page 15. One vehicle was a 
white pickup truck and the other was a Nissan passenger vehicle. 
4. He noted that both vehicles appeared to have occupants. The pickup truck was 
running and he thought the Nissan vehicle was probably running. 
5. The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle 
impossible. Castleberry at 16(15-20). 
6. A fifteen-year-old girl was in the driver's seat of the vehicle while defendant was 
sitting in the rear seat with another passenger who had difficulty in understanding or 
communicating in English. Castleberry at 17 (1-15). 
7. Because it was past curfew, and a juvenile was present who was not licensed to 
drive the vehicle, Deputy Castleberry sought identification from defendant who claimed to be the 
owner of the vehicle. Castleberry at 17 (20). 
8. Deputy Castleberry testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the 
curfew violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's 
time to be headed for home." But during the conversation he then learned that all the occupants 
were from San Pete County. He wanted further to check to see if anyone was licensed to drive 
the vehicle. Castleberry at 37 (16-18). 
9. After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castleberry then 
opened the rear door on the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with defendant because he was 
unable to see her through the window or from his vantage at the driver's open window. 
10. Officer Castleberry asked defendant for identification. Defendant indicated or 
pointed to a purse in the front passenger seat. Officer Castleberry testified that he decided to 
retrieve the license because it was located in a dark area over which he had no control. 
Castleberry at 17(6-7). 
11. Officer Castleberry, for safety reasons, then retrieved the purse himself. "I 
opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I believed to be her purse. . . As I reached for the 
purse, I noticed a small white bindle containing a wliite powdery substance sitting adjacent to the 
purse on the front seal." The bindle was in plain view on the passenger seat between the purse 
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and the console. The purse on the front seat did not belong to the defendant. While her driver's 
license was ultimately obtained, it was not obtained from the purse on the front seat. Castleberry 
at 18(18-22). 
12. Defendant's purse, containing her license, was located later by Officer Castleberry 
in the front passenger area of the vehicle. He could not recall whether it was in the glove 
compartment or the floor area, but was not on the front seat. 
13. Subsequent to entering the vehicle, finding the evidence, and seizing the drugs, 
Deputy Castleberry spoke with defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found. That questioning 
was conducted without giving defendant her Miranda warnings. Castleberry at 42 (9-11). 
14. Deputy Castleberry questioned defendant after finding the illegal drugs. He 
further testified that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs; (2) that person 
would be defendant if no one else claimed the drugs; and (3) that defendant was not free to leave 
during questioning. Castleberry at 41 (11-25) - 42 (1-8). 
15. Specifically, during the questioning of defendant, Miss Brake asked the deputy 
what was going to happen. Deputy Castleberry told her, "I said, if I cannot determine who owns 
the cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for 
what is inside your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came forth 
and claimed possession of it." Castleberry at 20 (21-25) - 21 (1-5). 
16. Officer Castleberry had called for backup and Officer Chipman arrived. He 
conducted a further search of the Nissan as Officer Castleberry continued his investigation and 
questioning of the occupants of both vehicles. 
17. Officer Chipman located, in plain view, a tin canister that had a straw in it and a 
razor blade. These items were located "up against the back window" of the Nissan near where 
the defendant was sitting. 
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ISSUES 
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence in this case because the search of the subject 
vehicle was conducted without a warrant and because statements by the defendant to Officer 
Castleberry were made without a Miranda warning. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Was Sgt. Castleberry's warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, which took 
place when the officer opened the front passenger door of the defendant's vehicle, 
permissible and justified? 
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement to substantiate a search. State v. Arrov, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P. 2d 289 (Utah, 1995). The State of Utah relies upon a Washington 
Court of Appeals case, State v. Grinier. 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983), which stands for the 
proposition that "if circumstances either place the police in danger or create a risk of loss or 
destruction of evidence, a warrantless search is permissible." Id. at 552 (Emphasis added.) If this 
is a paramount rule of law, one would certainly think there would be a case out of this 
jurisdiction, and some case other than a Washington intermediate court of appeals to announce it. 
This Court has carefully reviewed the testimony regarding Deputy Castleberry's 
decision to retrieve defendant's driver's license as contained in direct examination (Transcript, 
page 17, line 10-25; page 18, line 1 - 22) and cross examination (Transcript, page 33, lines 14-
25, and page 34, page 35, page 36, lines 1 - 25). Copies are attached. 
Officer Castleberry testified that he intended to retrieve the purse out of a sense of 
personal safety and to inspect the purse/area for weapons. Did he have sufficient justification to 
be concerned? These are the "officer safety" facts: 
1. Ke was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup. 
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2. It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in Utah 
County. 
3. The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer Castleberry 
described it as a "deserted road." 
4. There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each, (three occupants in 
the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked contiguous.) 
5. This was an area of frequent criminal activity. 
6. His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact that all of 
the windows were fogged up. 
7. The other vehicle was running and Officer Castleberry testified he believed the 
subject vehicle had the engine on with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl behind the wheel and two 
other passengers in the back seat. 
Ultimately would it have been permissible for Officer Castleberry to shine a flashlight 
through the passenger window for safety purposes? Yes. Then, since the window was fogged 
and severely restricted his vision, was he then justified to open the door? It is the opinion of the 
Court that under these circumstances the Officer was justified in opening the passenger door. 
When he did so the bindle of drugs was in plain view. Inevitably the drugs may have been 
discovered even if the defendant had retrieved the purse because the purse did not belong to her 
and presumably did not contain her license. 
The Mirquet ruling clarified factors to be considered by a Court in assessing whether a 
defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes is well settled. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda 
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 
degree associated with formal arrest. More specifically, Miranda warnings are 
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they 
exert upon the detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free 
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exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be wrarned 
of his constitutional rights. 
The "not free to leave" standard, on the other hand, determines whether 
a person has been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. That standard is broader than the Miranda standard. A person 
may be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for 
Fifth Amendment purposes. Whether one is "in custody" for Miranda 
purposes depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the 
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather 
than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the 
examination. 
In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, 
even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to 
leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. That is true even though an 
officer engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during 
the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a subjective, 
unstated intent to arrest the driver. . . 
To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a 
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest, Salt Lake City v. Carnen 664 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1983), set out four factors to be evaluated: 1) the site of the 
interrogation; 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether 
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of the 
interrogation" . . . 
In holding that Mirquet was in custody, the Court of Appeals, applying 
the Carner factors, found that 1) the site of the interrogation was inside the 
police car; 2) Officer Mangelson's investigation focused solely on defendant; 
3) the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4) the form of the interrogation 
evidenced a clear coercive intent on the part of the officer to prompt Mirquet 
to produce incriminating contraband; and 5) the place of the interrogation 
added to the coercive environment. 
The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate 
conclusion that the defendant was "in custody." Id at 1146, 47 & 48. 
(Emphasis added). 
ISSUE NO- 2 
At what point was the defendant in custody and the subject of an interrogation so 
as to require the officer to administer Miranda warnings to the defendant? 
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Both sides rely upon the case of State v Mirquet 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1996). This 
Court must apply the law contained in Mirquet to the facts of this case. The scenario of facts 
presented by the State of Utah in its briefing seems to rely upon the officer's report, which is not 
in evidence. The Court must rely upon the testimony at the hearing. 
Likewise, the defendant relies upon "facts" that are not in evidence, such as "the 
defendant was not experienced or knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure and the defendant 
had never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal record." These facts are not in 
evidence. Defense argues that Ms. Brake's "inexperience with the criminal justice system" 
together with other circumstances mandate that the Miranda warning should have been prior to 
interrogation. 
Defendant further argues that a reasonable person in Miss Brake's shoes (knowledge, 
experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject of a custodial 
interrogation by Deputy Castlebeny. While that might be a correct statement of the law, there is 
absolutely no testimony or evidence in the case respecting Ms. Brake's knowledge, experience 
and understanding or her "inexperience with the criminal justice system." She did not testify at 
the hearing and certainly there is no evidence that Deputy Castlebeny knew about or inquired 
about her past criminal history, past drug use or her knowledge of the criminal justice system or 
legal procedure. That would not have been permissible. 
In the case at bar, Officer Castlebeny observed a white plastic bindle on the passenger 
side front seat immediately after he opened the front door. He picked it up and asked who owned 
it, to which no one responded. The bindle was next to a purse. When the officer asked who 
owned the purse, the defendant, Ms. Brake or others, responded that the purse belonged to a 
young woman in the second vehicle, the white truck. While Castlebeny was speaking with this 
young woman, a backup officer, Deputy Chipman, arrived and Castlebeny directed him to search 
the defendant's vehicle. As Officer Chipman was searching the defendant's vehicle, Castlebeny 
spoke with several individuals including the defendant, Ms. Brake. He checked for signs of 
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cocaine use in various individuals and testified: "It appeared to me that all of the individuals that I 
looked at exhibited signs of having used cocaine." 
No one was "free to leave" while the officer asked questions. Applying the 
Mirquet/Carner test the Court finds: 
1. The questioning took place at the remote site in Officer Castlebeny's patrol 
vehicle; 
2. The investigation focused on all of the individuals in the two vehicles; 
3. There was no objective indicia of arrest; no handcuffing, no one being constrained 
in a vehicle; no formal "you are under arrest" directive. In addition, there was nothing said which 
attempted to coerce her or prompt her to retrieve incriminating evidence. 
4. The investigation was quite short and there was no coercive or accusatory 
statements. 
Accordingly, applying the four-pronged test, the Court does not find that Ms. Brake had 
been "deprived of her freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda warnings But 
once she had admitted "the specific bindle was hers in addition to any cocaine that - the residue 
that was found within the box. . . " the Miranda was implicated. It was not given at that stage and 
should have been. 
RULING 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. Counsel for the 
State of Utah is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to calendar this case in order to set a jury trial. 
Dated thi > *' day of October, 2000. ^ ^ S ^ ^ i ^ V 
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